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APPLICABILITY OF THE INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT OF 1940 TO REAL ESTATE
SYNDICATIONS
MANUEL F. COHEN AND ROBERT C. HACKER*
This paper will consider the application of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 [the 1940 Act]' to real estate syndications in three
problem areas: first, the "start up" problem; second, the second-tier
partnership problem; and third, the overall regulatory problem. Each
of these areas was considered recently by the Real Estate Advisory
Committee to the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 In addition,
the policies of the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC] regarding these problem areas have been spelled out to some
extent in no-action letters, public releases and exemptive orders
granted upon formal applications for exemption from the 1940 Act.
For the most part, however, the staff's policies have been articulated
in informal conferences with registrants and prospective registrants,
and accordingly have not become readily available to the public. Each
of the three problem areas will be discussed, highlighting the staff
position and the potential stumbling blocks presented by each.
I. THE "START UP" PROBLEM
A. The Statutory Basis
The "start up" problem can be illustrated by reference to S.E.C.
v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.,3 a case arising in a slightly differ-
ent context. Until early 1962, Fifth Avenue operated one of the na-
tion's largest privately owned municipal transit systems. However, in
March of that year, the City of New York acquired all of Fifth
Avenue's operating assets through condemnation proceedings. After
considerable litigation with the city, the corporation received an ini-
tial condemnation award of eleven and one-half million dollars. Fifth
Avenue then embarked upon an aggressive and active investment
program, purchasing the stock of several operating companies and
making several tender offers for the stock of another. The program
resulted in Fifth Avenue placing more than eight million dollars in
* Members of Washington, D.C. Bar.
'15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 - 80a-52 (1971)
2 SEC, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE ADVISORY COMMISSION, (1972) [hereinafter cited
as the "R.E.A.C. REPORT"].
3 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
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stocks or time deposits and, through trading and further investment,
reducing available cash to $843,000.1 The SEC contended that Fifth
Avenue became an investment company within the meaning of
§ 3(a)(1) of the 1940 Act' at the time it first received the condemna-
tion proceeds.' Fifth Avenue, on the other hand, argued that it was
not an investment company because it had endeavored from the time
it received the proceeds of the condemnation award, to gain operating
control of companies in order to become a conglomerate. 7 The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this latter contention. It
did not find that the Fifth Avenue became an investment company
immediately upon receipt of the award as contended by the SEC. It
did, however, accept the district court's finding that "Fifth has been
markedly unsuccessful in carrying out. . .[its] policy"' and held that
the corporation became an investment company shortly after initial
receipt of the proceeds. The lesson of Fifth Avenue is simple: when-
ever a company invests a substantial portion of its total assets in
securities, without also carrying on substantial operating activities,
the question of its classification as an investment company is likely
to arise.
The term "start up" period refers to the interval between the
completion of a public offering of interests in a limited real estate
partnership and its full investment of the proceeds and substantial
involvement in its real estate business activities. It is during this
hiatus, which is common to most real estate syndications, that the so-
called "start up" problem may arise. Because it is contrary to the
interest of the partnership for these uncommitted proceeds to be
sterile during the start up period, they are frequently invested
temporarily in instruments defined as securities in the 1940 Act.' It
is these temporary investments which, according to the SEC staff,
Id. at 514.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1971).
435 F.2d at 516.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (1970).
The definition of security is as follows:
"Security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of
indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral trust agreement, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a secu-
rity, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
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raise a question as to the status of the partnership under § 3(a)(3) of
the 1940 Act.1" In essence, § 3(a)(3) defines an investment company
as a company which is engaged in the business of investing in securi-
ties and which owns investment securities having a value exceeding
forty percent of the value of the company's total assets. Government
securities and cash items are excluded in making the calculation.,
The SEC staff tends to de-emphasize the first part of the definition,
which states that the company must be engaged "in the business"'' 2
of investing in securities. It generally takes the position that any
issuer which holds investment securities (exclusive of Government
securities and cash items) representing in excess of forty percent of
the value of its total assets automatically falls within § 3(a)(3). 3
Therefore, a limited partnership which, during the start up period,
invests a substantial portion of the proceeds of its public offering in
investment securities may technically fall within the § 3(a)(3) defini-
tion and thus be subject to the registration and other provisions of
the 1940 Act.
It may seem, at first blush, that the start up problem can be
avoided simply by investing the proceeds of the public offering during
the start up period in Government securities or in cash items, since
these investments are excepted by § 3(a)(3) from the forty percent
test. Moreover, rule 6-03 of Regulation S-X, which prescribes ac-
counting rules for investment companies, includes as "cash items"
time deposits, call loans, and funds subject to withdrawal within one
year." Thus, the court in S.E.C. v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.,5
held that interest-bearing cash accounts and certificates of deposit
falling within rule 6-03 are cash items excluded from the calculation
under § 3(a)(3). However, it should be noted that in Fifth Avenue the
Commission took the position that certificates of deposit and
interest-bearing cash accounts constitue "investment securities" and
not "cash items" if they are held for investment purposes. Further-
more, the Commission has not acquiesced in Fifth A venue's 6 holding
to the contrary.
However certificates of deposit and cash accounts may be
treated under § 3(a)(3), the staff relies on an alternate definition of
10 15 U.S.C. § 80a-(3)(a)(3) (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1970).
12 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1970).
13 Id.
1 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-03 (1974).
15 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
1' See SEC Interpretive Letter to Samuel Lippman (available November 19, 1973).
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an investment company in § 3(a)(1),17 in cases where § 3(a)(3) is not
clearly applicable. Section 3(a)(1) provides, in part, that an invest-
ment company is any company which is "primarily" engaged in in-
vesting in securities. Government securities, regardless of their status
under § 3(a)(3), are, of course, securities; and under the staffs inter-
pretation, interest-bearing cash items such as certificates of deposit
and interest-bearing accounts also fall within the definition of a secu-
rity."8 The staff takes the position that any company which, over a
significant period of time, invests a substantial amount of its assets
in securities (including Government securities and interest-bearing
cash items) and receives a substantial part of its total income from
such investments, is "primarily engaged in the business" of investing
in such securities within the meaning of § 3(a)(l).19 Therefore, a lim-
ited partnership which invests a substantial part of the proceeds of
its public offering for a significant period in securities, including
Government securities and interest-bearing cash items, may fall
within the definition in § 3(a)(1). 21
B. The Evolving Staff Position
Until recently, the staff had taken the position that no question
would be raised under the 1940 Act if the proceeds of a public offering
were invested in securities during the start up period, so long as such
proceeds did not remain invested in securities for a period in excess
of ninety days.2' The staff policy was described as follows:
If, . . . substantially more than 25 percent of the assets of the
Company would be invested in such securities, the Company would
be invested in such securities, the Company would be an investment
company and would be required to register under the Investment
Company Act. Therefore, unless within a relatively short time, not
to exceed 90 days, the Company has binding contractual obligations
to acquire operating assets and has specific bonafide plans to com-
mit enough of the proceeds to operating activities to solve the prob-
lem the Company will either then register as an investment com-
pany, or if the facts warrant, file an application for exemption
.... Thus, it may be necessary if no specific plans are made within
such 90-day period to commit a sufficient portion of the proceeds
17 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1970).
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 340-46 (1967).
' This is the basic position adopted in S.E.C. v. Fifth Avenue Coach, discussed, supra,
text accompanying notes 3 and 4.
21 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (1970).
21 See, e.g., SEC no-action letter to Boston Financial Rehabilitation Partnership - I
(available July 2, 1972).
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to operating activities, to hold the uncommitted portion of such
proceeds in a non-interest-bearing account pending application
thereof.2
This position by the staff would, of course, require a partnership
to hold most of its uncommitted proceeds in cash if such proceeds
could not be used in its real estate activities within ninety days of its'
public offering. The partnership would thereby lose the interest it
could have otherwise earned pending investment. That position was
the subject of much criticism.P The Real Estate Advisory Commit-
tee recommended
• . . that the Commission consider enunciating a policy permitting
such partnerships to use the proceeds from their offerings which are
awaiting direct or indirect commitment to real estate to hold (and
not trade) securities as defined in §§ 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(3) of the 1933
Act for a reasonable time period. For example, such use would be
permitted, provided that not more than 70 percent of such proceeds
are so used for more than 365 days and 40 percent for 720 days from
the date of the offering. 4
The staff now appears to be taking a more flexible approach to
the start up problem. It has recognized that under certain circumstan-
ces the public interest is not served by an insistence that uncommitted
proceeds, if not used in the business within a certain period, be re-
tained in cash.25 The staff has not yet however, adopted the position
recommended by the Real Estate Advisory Committee. The authors
are advised that the staff currently will raise a question of status
under the 1940 Act if the proceeds from the public offering of a
partnership are invested in securities for a period in excess of 180 days
from the time of the initial public offering. To avoid this prollem,
the real estate partnership should anticipate making binding contrac-
tual commitments to expend uncommitted proceeds for its real estate
activities within six months of its public offering or otherwise restruc-
turing its activities so as to avoid the "engaged primarily" test.
II. THE "Two-TIER" PROBLEM
The so-called "two-tier" problem is related to the exemption
2 R.E.A.C. REPORT at 51.
2 See, e.g., R.E.A.C. REPORT at 52.
24 Id. at 52.
See, e.g., National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance Corporation, SEC, Investment
Companies Act [hereinafter cited as I.C.A.] Rel. No. 6078 (1970), cited in R.E.A.C. REPORT
at 52.
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
found in § 3(c)(5) of the 1940 Act.26 Real estate partnerships can be
viewed as one-tier or second-tier partnerships. A one-tier partnership
is one which invests directly in interests in real estate. No problem is
raised under the 1940 Act by a single-tier partnership because, under
§ 3(c)(5)(c) of the Act,2 companies primarily engaged in the business
of purchasing or otherwise acquiring interests in real estate are ex-
cepted from the definition of investment company. However, the staff
has taken the position that a limited partnership interest in a partner-
ship which invests directly in real estate projects is not itself an inter-
est in the real estate; rather, it is deemed to be a type of security.28
Therefore, a partnership which invests the substantial part of its as-
sets in limited partnership interests of other real estate partnerships
(thus creating the so-called two-tier partnership) may be deemed to
be engaged primarily in the business of investing in securities. It is
for this reason that the second-tier partnerships raise a question of
status under §§ 3(a)(1) and 3(a)(3) of the 1940 Act.21
The Commission recently addressed this question in an interpre-
tive release.30 The release states that in the opinion of the Division
of Investment Management Regulation, any issuer which is primarily
engaged in the business of investing in limited partnership interests
issued by partnerships engaged in the real estate business is an invest-
ment company within the meaning of § 3(a)(1) of the Act.31 A
second-tier partnership might, however, not be deemed to fall within
3(a)(1) if other facts indicate that the partnership is, in fact, primarily
engaged, through its general partner, in carrying on the business
activities of the underlying limited partnerships in which it has in-
vested.32
The release goes on to note that the ownership of limited part-
nership interests might also cause the second-tier partnership to fall
within the definition of investment company contained within §
3(a)(3) of the Act33 if it holds limited partnership interests having a
value exceeding forty percent of the value of its total assets and if
such limited partnership interests are "investment securities" within
the meaning of the Act. Since investment securities are defined to
26 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5) (1970).
27 Id.
23 SEC, I.C.A. Rel. No. 8456, BNA SECURITES REGULATION & L. REP., No. 265, F-I
(Aug. 9, 1974).
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (1970).
" Note 28, supra.
31 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(I) (1970).
32 Note 28, supra.
33 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1970).
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exclude securities issued by majority-owned subsidiaries which are
not themselves investment companies, the Division will take a "no-
action" position if (1) the second-tier partnership owns more than
fifty percent of the limited partnership interests in all the underlying
limited partnerships in which it invests and has the right to dismiss
and replace the general partners of such underlying partnerships, and
the limited partners of the second-tier partnership also have the right
to dismiss and replace their general partner; (2) the second-tier part-
nership is not an investment company within the meaning of§ 3(a)(1);
that is to say, the general partner of the second-tier partnership is
primarily engaged in carrying on the business of the underlying lim-
ited partnerships; and (3) the second-tier partnership, in reliance upon
an opinion of counsel that registration is not required, does not regis-
ter as an investment company."
If a second-tier partnership does fall within the definition of an
investment company contained in § 3(a)(3),35 it may seek exemption
from registration by filing an application for exemption pursuant to§ 3(b)(2) of the Act." Section 3(b)(2) in essence provides that, not-
withstanding § 3(a)(2), the Commission may exempt any issuer which
it finds to be primarily engaged in a business other than investing in
securities, either directly or through (A) majority-owned subsidiaries,
or (B) controlled companies conducting similar types of businesses.
It is the Division's position that a second-tier partnership, even
though owning less than fifty percent of the limited partnership inter-
ests in the underlying limited partnerships, may nonetheless qualify
for exemption under § 3(b)(2) if, in fact, it is directly engaged in the
real estate business through its control of the underlying limited part-
nerships .37
Finally, the release notes that the Division may also allow ex-
emptions pursuant to § 6(c) of the 1940 Act for second-tier partner-
ships which invest in limited partnerships engaged in the development
of housing for low and moderate income persons. Since the assets
of such second-tier partnerships consist almost entirely of limited
partnership interests in local partnerships and since the second-tier
partnerships typically are not themselves directly engaged in the busi-
ness of developing or operating the low and moderate income hous-
31 SEC, I.C.A. Rel. No. 8456, BNA SECURITIES REGULATION & L. REP., No. 265, at F-
2 (Aug. 9, 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1970).
7 Note 34, supra.
3'Id.
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ing, such second-tier partnerships would be subject to registration
unless exempted pursuant to § 6(c).39 Section 6(c) grants the Com-
mission authority to exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any
person from any or all the provisions of the 1940 Act if it finds that
such exemption is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest and
consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly
intended by the policy and provisions of [the 1940 Act]."4
The Commission has, for a variety of reasons, found that exemp-
tion of these second-tier partnerships from all provisions of the 1940
Act meets the requisite public interest standard. First, such partner-
ships usually promote the construction of federally assisted low and
moderate income housing, which Congress has recognized to be in the
national interest. Second, investors in such partnerships will be upper
tax bracket individuals who presumably are "sophisticated" investors
interested primarily in the tax shelter provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code." Third, various provisions of the 1940 Act require, among
other things, election of independent members of a board of directors
and a high degree of security holder control over the affairs of the
partnership. 2 Such partnerships cannot comply with these provisions
without risking loss of the favorable pass-through tax treatment, 43
which is a principal motive for investment in such partnerships, as
well as loss of the investor's limited liability provided under state
limited partnership law."
The Commission first considered the second-tier partnership in
the exemption application filed with the Commission in 1969 by the
National Corporation for Housing Partnerships [the Corporation]
and the National Housing Partnership [the Partnership], referred to
hereinafter jointly as the N.H.P.5 The Corporation and Partnership
were created pursuant to Title IX of the Housing and Urban Devel-
opment Act of 1968,4 with the original incorporators being appointed
by the President of the United States. Thereafter, twelve members of
the Corporation's board of directors were elected by the shareholders
and three additional directors were appointed by the President. The
Corporation serves as a general partner of the Partnership, which
invests in limited partnership interests issued by local partnerships
11 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
40 Id.
41 Note 34, supra.
42 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1970).
13 See Treas. Reg. 310.7701-2 (1960), as amended T.D. 6797, 1965-1 Cum. BULL. 553.
" See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7.
" SEC, I.C.A. Rel. No. 5945, 35 Fed. Reg. 201 (1970).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3931-40 (1973).
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engaged in developing low and moderate income housing under var-
ious federal subsidy programs. In light of the unique nature of
N.H.P., the Commission found it in the public interest to grant it a
complete exemption from the 1940 Act. 7
Following the granting of the N.H.P. exemption, a number of
second-tier partnerships, relying on the N.H.P. precedent, sought and'
were granted exemptions from the 1940 Act.4 Although these part-
nerships were organized to invest in local partnerships involved in
federally subsidized housing. development, they were not (as was
N.H.P.) organized pursuant to an Act of Congress by individuals
appointed by the President. Rather, these partnerships were typically
organized by a private promoter who served as general partner. On
the ground that it was consistent with § 6(c),49 the Real Estate Advi-
sory Committee recommended that the Commission continue its pol-
icy of exempting second-tier real estate limited partnerships where
the underlying partnerships are engaged in the construction of low
and moderate income housing. 0
The Commission, however, had certain difficulties with its past
exemption policy for such partnerships. To assure their limited liabil-
ity, relevant state law requires that the limited partners not exercise
control of management of the partnership. Therefore, limited part-
nerships, whether one-tier or second-tier, necessarily require the type
of "externalized" management which, in the case of investment com-
panies, is considered to carry the potential for a variety of self-dealing
abuses. In light of this potential for such abuses, the Commission has
under consideration the regulatory problem involved in all tax-shelter
partnerships. This overall regulatory problem is the third area of
application of the 1940 Act to real estate syndications, and will dis-
cussed momentarily. The problem is mentioned at this point, how-
ever, because it is interwoven with the Commission's policy with
respect to exemption of the second-tier partnerships involved in low
and moderate income housing. In light of the regulatory problem
presented by such partnerships, the Commission directed the staff to
reconsider its exemption policy with respect to such second-tier part-
nerships.
47 SEC, I.C.A. Rel. No. 5955 (Jan. 17, 1970).
1s See, e.g., Condren Housing Partners, SEC, I.C.A. Rel. Nos. 6807, 6851 (Nov. 29,
1971); Boston Financial Housing Partnerships, SEC, I.C.A. Rel. Nos. 6822, 6883 (Dec. 9,
1971); Boston Financial Rehabilitation Partnerships - I, SEC, I.C.A. Rel. Nos. 7019, 7075
(Mar. 20, 1972); American Housing Partners, SEC, I.C.A. Rel. Nos. 7178,7215 (June 5, 1972).
n 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
50 R.E.A.C. REPORT at 54.
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It was in this context that the exemption application under § 6(c)
for N.H.P.-II was filed in August of 1973.1 In order to qualify for
exemption the Commission Release, heretofore referred to, on
second-tier partnerships suggests that § 6(c) exemptions henceforth be
patterned, more or less, on the conditions agreed to in the N.H.P.-II
application. N.H.P.-II was organized by N.H.P., which acts as its
general partner. Its principal activity is the purchase of a substantial
portion of N.H.P.'s equity interest in government assisted rental
housing projects. Therefore, N.H.P.-II, or the local partnerships in
which it invests, may engage in transactions with persons or entities
affiliated with the general partner or its directors, officers, and em-
ployees, or with limited partners of N.H.P. The regulatory concern
over such self-dealing transactions was resolved through rather de-
tailed conditions, spelled out in the release of the Commission notic-
ing the N.H.P.-II application for exemption. 52
N.H.P. agreed to several basic conditions. First, interests in
N.H.P.-II would be sold only to "sophisticated" investors.5 3
Second, the interests which N.H.P.-II will acquire and the terms
under which it will acquire such interests would be fully stated in its
prospectus and would not be made subject to the discretion of man-
agement. 4
Third, N.H.P.-II's investments would be governed by policies
which could not be changed except by the vote of the holders of at
least a majority of its outstanding interests. Furthermore, the inves-
tors in N.H.P.-II were to have voting rights with respect to, among
other things, the dissolution of N.H.P.-II, amendments to
N.H.P.-II's limited partnership agreement and management con-
tract, and under certain circumstances, the withdrawal of the general
partners.5
Fourth, N.H.P.-II would enter into transactions with affiliated
persons or entities only if management determined that the terms are
reasonable and fair and consistent with the policies and purposes of
N.H.P.-II, do not involve overreaching on the part of any party, and
are no less favorable to N.H.P.-II than those offered by others in the
same vicinity. N.H.P.-II would have the right to terminate any con-
tract with any such affiliated person or entity without penalty on sixty
day's notice."
11 SEC, I.C.A. Rel. No. 7947, 38 Fed. Reg. 22585 (1973).
52 Id.
53 Id.
51 38 Fed. Reg. at 22586.
5Id.
5Id.
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The Commission's two-tier partnership release suggests that its
exemption policy under § 6(c) 57 will be available only to second-tier
partnerships involved in the development of low and moderate in-
come housing. Thus, other types of second-tier real estate partner-
ships which do not promote a recognized national public policy may
be deemed investment companies and, as such, required to register.
under the 1940 Act, unless they can qualify for exemption under
§ 3(b)(2)18 as being primarily engaged in a business other than invest-
ing in securities (either directly or through subsidiary or controlled
underlying partnerships). Moreover, whether or not a second-tier
partnership is required to register under the 1940 Act, the general
partner of such a partnership may be deemed an investment adviser
required to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 51 The
term "investment adviser" is defined in § 202(a)(I 1) of the Advisers
Act" as any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or
selling securities. Although the staff appears never to have had occa-
sion to consider the applicability of this definition to the general
partner of a second-tier real estate partnership, the staff has applied
the definition to the general partner of an analogous type of limited
partnership - the "hedge" fund.
A hedge fund is a limited partnership in which the contributions
of the limited partners are pooled and invested by the general partner
in equity securities. Thus, like the second-tier real estate partnership,
the hedge fund is a partnership primarily engaged in investing in and
holding securities. The staff takes the view that each limited partner,
and not solely the partnership itself, is a "client" of the general
partner." Hence the general partner of a hedge fund fits the definition
of "investment adviser" because (1) the general partner is in the
business of deciding, on a discretionary basis, how to invest his
clients' contributions in securities (which activity the staff deems to
"encompass the act of recommending" such securities), and (2) the
general partner's share of the profits of the partnership, in excess of
his pro rata share, on the basis of his capital contribution to the
partnership, constitutes "compensation" for his investment advisory
services.12 One problem raised by registration as an investment ad-
57 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 - 80b-21 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1970).
6, Weiss, Personal Views of SEC Staff Members, in INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND
"OFFSHORE" INVESTMENT FUNDS (Practising Law Institute, J. McCord, ed. 1969) at 364-65
[hereinafter cited as "PLI"].
52 PLI at 363-64. The activities of such a limited partnership may also raise a question of
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viser is that such a general partner would, among other things, have
to conform with 205(1) of the Advisers Act,6" which prohibits a
registered investment adviser from basing his compensation on a
share of capital gains upon, or capital appreciation of, the funds of
any portion of the funds of the client.
III. THE OVERALL REGULATORY PROBLEM
As has been pointed out earlier, the structure of a limited part-
nership, which in effect, requires the "externalization" of manage-
ment, raises a potential for self-dealing abuses. It is also fairly appar-
ent that real estate tax-shelter partnerships, whether organized as a
one-tier or as a second-tier partnership, raise other regulatory prob-
lems. For example, currently under study and debate is the question
whether limited partners should receive operational and financial re-
ports and have the right to exercise adequate voting power. 4
Further, it seems reasonable that the general partner should be
required to have a certain minimum level of expertise and to maintain
an adequate level of capitalization, and that the formulae used to
compensate general partners be reasonable and described in an un-
derstandable format. With respect to regulation at the federal level
of tax-shelter real estate partnerships, the Real Estate Advisory
Committee recommended:
[T]he Committee believes that, [currently] . . . the Commission
should not attempt to regulate, directly or indirectly, the distribu-
tion of real estate [partnership] securities, but should continue to
compel the full and complete disclosure standards of the 1933 Act
and regulatory requirements of the 1934 Act, intensifying disclosure
and increasing policing and reporting standards.
However, if uniform [state] regulation is not achieved, say within a
year, we believe the Commission should give serious consideration
to sponsoring federal legislation which would permit real estate
its status as a "dealer", which is defined in § 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account. PLI at
374. With respect to the activities of NHP, however, the SEC staff has raised no question of
registration as a "broker" or "dealer" on the basis of counsel's opinion that NHP was engaged
in the business of developing low and moderate income housing in the manner congressionally
mandated by statute. See SEC letter to Manuel F. Cohen (Feb. 26, 1971).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(l) (1970).
1' See, e.g., N.A.S.D. proposed Article III, § 33 of Rules of Fair Practice and proposed
regulations to be adopted pursuant thereto in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEAL-
ERS, TAX SHELTERED PROGRAMS (1973); SEC, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 10260, BNA
SECURITIES REGULATION & L. REP. No. 209, F-I (July 2, 1973).
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[partnership] securities to be sold on a national basis once having
been cleared by the Commission in accordance with the regulations
deemed appropriate by the Commission. 5
The Real Estate Advisory Committee suggested that such fed-
eral regulatory legislation governing tax-shelter real estate partner-
ships might be patterned on the SEC's proposed Oil and Gas Invest-
ment Act,6" which would subject tax-shelter oil and gas partnerships
to comprehensive federal regulation. The Oil and Gas Investment Act
is, to the extent relevant, patterned after the regulatory provisions of
the 1940 Act. In addition, the Commission, in a recent release re-
questing comments on the National Association of Security Dealer's
[N.A.S.D.] proposed tax shelter regulations, indicated that it is
actively considering the question of regulation at the federal level of
tax-shelter partnerships. In this release the Commission stated that
"information gathered by the Commission through its surveillance
programs and cooperative efforts of the state authorities and
N.A.S.D. indicates that additional regulation of tax shelters . . .
may well be needed."6
The SEC release also asked for comments regarding certain
policy issues raised by the N.A.S.D.'s proposal to regulate, indirectly,
tax shelters. Under the N.A.S.D.'s proposed regulations, 9 its mem-
bers would be precluded from selling a partnership interest unless the
partnership complied with specified standards and conditions. The
N.A.S.D., accordingly, would seem to be indirectly regulating the
issuers of securities, as well as the distribution of securities by
N.A.S.D. members. In other words, the proposed N.A.S.D. regula-
tions appear to deal with the merits of the securities offerings of
partnerships in much the same way as do state blue sky regulations,
a proposal inconsistent with a basic premise of the federal securities
laws from which the N.A.S.D. must seek its authority. The Commis-
sion release accordingly questioned whether the N.A.S.D.'s jurisdic-
tion under the Maloney Act" was sufficiently broad to allow the
N.A.S.D. to adopt regulations in the nature of blue sky regulations. 71
The proposed N.A.S.D. regulations also raised a question under
R.E.A.C. REPORT at 34.
' R.E.A.C. REPORT at 4 (Oil and Gas Investment Act, S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972), reintroduced as S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), as submitted by the SEC.)
11 SEC, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 10260, BNA SECURITIES REGULATION & L.
REP., No. 209, F-i (July 2, 1973).
'6 Id. at F-4.
" NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, TAX SHELTERED PROGRAMS (1973).
70 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1970).
1 Note 66, supra.
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the anti-trust laws. N.A.S.D. members would be prohibited from
offering the interests of any tax-shelter partnership which did not
comply with the proposed regulations. It could be argued that the
N.A.S.D. members would be involved in a group boycott of non-
complying partnerships.12 While the N.A.S.D. is authorized and re-
quired to promulgate rules designed to promote just and equitable
principles of trade and to protect investors and the public interest,73
such a group boycott would violate the anti-trust laws, unless it fell
within the umbrella of the N.A.S.D.'s anti-trust immunity.74 While
the N.A.S.D. and its members are immune from attack in some of
their activities, the precise extent of their anti-trust immunity is un-
clear. The scope of an anti-trust exemption from the Exchange Act
has been construed as being governed by the principles set forth in
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,75 which dealt with action taken
by the New York Stock Exchange [N.Y.S.E.] allegedly in fulfillment
of its self-regulatory responsibilities under the Exchange Act. In
Silver, the N.Y.S.E. directed certain of its member firms to discon-
tinue private-wire connections with two nonmember, over-the-
counter broker-dealers.76 The Exchange offered the nonmembers no
reason for the action, and it did not give prior notice or an opportun-
ity to be heard. The nonmember broker dealers brought suit against
the N.Y.S.E., alleging violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court held that absent any justification derived from
the policy of another statute, the N.Y.S.E.'s action constituted a
group boycott, a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act. It stated
71 Cf., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970).
An applicant association shall not be registered as a national securities associa-
tion unless it appears to the Commission that -
(8) the rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipu-
lative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide
safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or
other charges, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a free and open market; and
are not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers or issuers, or
brokers or dealers, to fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule of prices, or to
impose any schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances, discounts,
or other charges.
1' 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1970), which provides:
"[l]f any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law of the
United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall prevail."
75 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
' 373 U.S. at 344.
15 U.S.C. §§ I and 2 (1970).
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that the Securities Exchange Act does not provide a complete exemp-
tion from the anti-trust laws, but rather that the assertion of an anti-
trust claim must yield to the exemption implied by the policy of the
Exchange Act in those particular instances of exchange self-
regulation which fall within the scope and purpose of the statute.
However, the Court noted that self-regulatory action by the Ex-
change will be deemed implicitly exempt from anti-trust claims
". .. only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the
aims of the Securities Exchange Act ... ."I' The Court held that
the Exchange's failure to give the nonmember broker dealers notice
and an opportunity to be heard could not be justified as necessary to
achieve the aims of the Exchange Act, and hence the Exchange's
denial of private-wire connection without notice or an opportunity for
hearing was not exempt from the anti-trust claim.
The Fifth Circuit, in Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc.,71
adopted this view of the N.A.S.D. anti-trust exemption. After dis-
cussing Silver, the Court in Harwell concluded "[i]t seems to us that
§ 78o-3(n) ° [the N.A.S.D.'s immunity section] provides no more"8'
than does the Silver opinion. Thus, if Silver is followed, a group
boycott by N.A.S.D. members of tax shelter issuers who fail to meet
the N.A.S.D.'s proposed regulations will fall within the N.A.S.D.'s
immunity from anti-trust barriers "only if those actions are necessary
to make the statutory scheme for regulation for securities dealers
work, and then only to the minimum extent necessary. '8 2 Accord-
ingly, if that is the correct view, one question raised by the
N.A.S.D.'s proposed regulations, insofar as they apply to the internal
structure and operations of tax-shelter partnerships, is whether regu-
lations directed to the operation, structure and management of tax
shelter issuers who are not N.A.S.D. members are "necessary" to
make the N.A.S.D.'s regulation of its member securities dealers
work.1
3
373 U.S. at 361.
451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971).
15 U.S.C. 78o-3(n) (1970).
11 451 F.2d at 247.
82 Id.
1 The scope of the N.A.S.D.'s anti-trust immunity under the Silver doctrine has been
clarified somewhat in two recent Supreme Court opinions, Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, 43 U.S.L.W. 4958 (June 26, 1975), and U.S. v. NASD, 43 U.S.L.W. 4968 (June
26, 1975). In Gordon the Court indicated that where the SEC has, and exercises, direct regula-
tory jurisdiction over the self-regulatory actions taken by the Exchange (unlike Silver, where
the SEC had no statutory power to review individual disciplinary actions taken by the Ex-
change), anti-trust immunity will be implied, as a matter of law, to the extent that the allowance
of an anti-trust suit would conflict with the SEC's jurisdiction to oversee such Exchange self-
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After reviewing the comments regarding the N.A.S.D. proposed
tax shelter rules, the Commission, by letter of May 6, 1974, advised
the N.A.S.D. that
With respect to those rules included in the proposal relating to the
operation, structure and management of tax shelter programs, the
Commission does not believe, at this time, that the Association
should attempt to provide a regulatory structure which impacts, as
do those rules, directly on issuers, sponsors and others which are not
members of the Association. 4
Thus, direct regulation of the operations, structure and management
of tax shelter partnerships of the type proposed by the N.A.S.D.
continues to be the exclusive province of the various state blue sky
administrators. The Commission's May 6, 1974 letter, however, went
on to note that it is not necessary to conclude that state securities
commissions need carry the entire regulatory burden:
Because of existing and potential abuses in connection with tax
shelter programs, the Commission has directed its staff to continue
to collect information with respect to abuses involving tax shelter
programs and to formulate various proposals, including new rules
or guidelines applicable to all packagers and promoters of tax shel-
ter programs, enlarged enforcement programs and suggestions for
additional legislation, for the consideration of the Commission so
that it will be in a position to determine how best to provide proper
regulation."5
Thus the Commission's question "how best to provide proper
regulation" returns us to our consideration of the applicability of the
1940 Act to tax shelter partnerships. The basic approach to regula-
tion under the securities laws, of course, has been through requiring
issuers to provide full and fair disclosure and through vigorous en-
regulatory actions. In U.S. v. NASD the Court considered that the SEC oversight jurisdiction
under the Maloney Act of the self-regulatory rules and interpretations adopted by the N.A.S.D.
was so pervasive as to imply, as a matter of law, immunity from the anti-trust laws for
N.A.S.D. rule-making and interpretations adopted with the sanction of the SEC. These deci-
sions emphasize the difficult policy issue faced by the SEC as a result of the N.A.S.D.'s
proposed tax shelter regulations. If such regulations are necessary to make the N.A.S.D.'s
regulation of its own members work, then the SEC must undertake direct regulatory oversight
jurisdiction over the N.A.S.D.'s regulation of a class of issuers. The SEC would thereby be
undertaking for tax shelter issuers a regulatory role similar to that of state blue sky authorities,
a role the SEC has traditionally eschewed. Only in the case of investment companies and public
utility holding companies, where the SEC is given specific statutory authority, has the SEC
undertaken direct regulation of the internal structure and operations of issuers.
14 Letter from SEC to Gordon S. Macklin, President, National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., BNA SECURITIEs REGULATION & L. REP., No. 256, D-I (May 6, 1974).
5 Id.
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forcement of the law's anti-fraud provisions, rather than through
direct Commission regulation of the operation, structure and man-
agement of issuers. An exception to this approach is found in the 1940
Act which subjects registered investment companies to direct regula-
tion by the Commission. One reason for having adopted this ap-
proach in the case of investment companies is that investment compa-
nies typically are operated through an externalized management
company which is considered a potential source for conflicts of inter-
est. As already noted, tax shelter partnerships likewise are operated
through a form of "externalized management." The Commission
cited this fact in support of its proposed legislation which would
subject tax shelter oil and gas partnerships to federal regulation pat-
terned, insofar as practicable, on the regulatory provisions of the
1940 Act.86 In exempting certain second-tier real estate partnerships,
the Commission similarly has imposed conditions patterned, more or
less, on the 1940 Act provisions regulating conflicts of interest.
Hence, in considering how best to provide proper regulation of tax
shelter partnerships, one source to which the Commission will appar-
ently look is the existing regulatory pattern established in the 1940
Act. Should the Commission conclude that the overall regulatory
problem of tax shelter partnerships requires additional legislation, the
1940 Act provisions, modified to fit the structure and method of
operations of the tax shelter issuers, would provide one likely regula-
tory approach.
1 Oil and Gas Investment Act, S. 3884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., (1972), reintroduced as S.
1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
